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CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND THE
GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM
FRANK A. FELDER*
To be successful, climate change mitigation policy must ac-
count for the global energy system (GES), which is a complex,
large-scale, integrated, open, and socio-technical (CLIOS) system
with long-lived, sunk (irreversible) assets that are subject to the in-
teractions of consumers, producers, and politicians with economic
and political incentives, and protracted public processes spanning
multiple governmental jurisdictions. These structural elements re-
sult in several generic issues that climate change mitigation policies
need to address to be effective, such as scalability, inertia, unantici-
pated outcomes, and the need to integrate political, economic, and
technical factors.
I. INTRODUCTION AND CURRENT STATE OF
CLIMATE MITIGATION POLICY
Global climate change mitigation policy is at a near standstill.
There seems to be no near-term prospect of meaningful global ac-
tion to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at levels that avoid
harmful increases in global average temperatures and associated cli-
mate changes and negative impacts. This current state of affairs has
triggered a great deal of scholarly work on the question of how to
move forward.'
The fact that global climate change mitigation policy (mitiga-
tion) is stalled has been widely proclaimed. Major business as usual
forecasts of the long-term future global energy picture indicate that
the world will fall short of achieving climate mitigation goals, as
* Associate Research Professor and Director of the Center for Energy, Eco-
nomic and Environmental Policy, EdwardJ. Bloustein School of Planning and Pub-
lic Policy, Rutgers University. Professor Felder conducts research on energy policy,
electricity markets, evaluations of energy efficiency and renewable resources, and
the effects of climate change on electric power systems. He earned a B.S. and B.A.
from the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Columbia College at
Columbia University, a S.M. in Technology and Policy, and Ph.D. in Technology,
Management and Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1. See Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, BELFER CTR. FOR Sci. & INT'L AF-
FAIRS, http://belfercenter.ksg.barvard.edu/project/56/harvard-project-on_
climate-agreements.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (collecting scholarly works
devoted to climate change).
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discussed by Felder, Andrews, and Hulkower. 2 The International
Energy Agency (IEA) concluded in 2012, "Taking all new develop-
ments and policies into account, the world is still failing to put the
global energy system onto a more sustainable path."3 The IEA con-
tinued, "Global energy demand increases by over one-third in the
period 2035. Energy-related CO 2 emissions rise from an estimated
31.2 Gt (giga tons) in 2011 to 37.0 Gt in 2035, pointing to a long-
term average temperature increase of 3.6 oC." 4 The New York
Times summarized the 2012 meeting of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as follows: "Dele-
gates from more than 190 nations agreed to extend the increasingly
ineffective Kyoto Protocol a few years and to commit to more ambi-
tious - but unspecified - actions to reduce emissions of climate-
altering gases."5 The report continued, "The Doha meeting did not
produce even the barest outline of what that new agreement [that
would replace the Kyoto Protocol] would look like, leaving those
questions for future meetings."6
According to Joseph Aldy and Robert Stavins, "A way forward is
needed for the post-2012 period to address the threat of global cli-
mate change."7 The authors continue with an evaluation of the
weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol:
First, some of the largest emitters are not constrained by
Kyoto. The Protocol has not been ratified by the United
States, and it does not include emissions targets for some
of the largest and most rapidly growing economies in the
2. See Frank Felder, Clinton J. Andrews, & Seth D. Hulkower, Which Energy
Future?, in Energy Sustainability and the Environment: Technology, Incentives, Be-
havior 31-62 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., Elsevier Press 2011) (discussing business
projections of climate change mitigation plans).
3. World Energy Outlook 2012 Factsheet, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, 1 (2012), available
at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/factsheets.pdf
(noting fossil fuels remain dominant source of energy).
4. Id. (concluding lower rates of world-wide economic growth would have
minimal impacts on current energy and climate patterns).
5. John M. Broder, Climate Talks Yield Commitment to Ambitious, but Unclear, Ac-
tions, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/science/
earth/talks-on-climate-produce-promises-and-complaints.html (documenting
struggles in various plans aimed at cutting greenhouse gases).
6. Id. (focusing on lack of detailed plans aimed at replacing Kyoto).
7. JOSEPH E. ALDY & ROBERT N. STAVINS, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, DESIGNING THE PosT-KvoTo CLIMATE REGIME: LESSONS FROM THE HARVARD
PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS. AN INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT
FOR THE 14TH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES Xi (2008), available at http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Interim%20Report%20081203%20Akiko%20
v6.pdf (claiming broad-based consensus on any successor to Kyoto is needed to be
effective).
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developing world. Second, a relatively small number of
countries are asked to take action, which has resulted in
concerns about emissions leakage and competitiveness.
Third, the nature of the Protocol's emissions trading ele-
ments has caused concern. The provision in Article 17 for
international emissions trading among nation-states is un-
likely to be effective, if it is utilized at all. And the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) is plagued by criticisms
that it is crediting projects that would have happened any-
way (commonly known as the problem of "additionality").
Fourth, the Kyoto Protocol-with its five year time hori-
zon (2008 to 2012)-represents a relatively short-term ap-
proach for what is fundamentally a long-term problem.
Finally, the agreement may not provide sufficient incen-
tives for compliance.8
The first step forward is defining the criteria by which any miti-
gation proposal should be assessed, such as how "scientifically
sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic" it is.9
Specifically:
By "scientifically sound" we mean an international agree-
ment that is consistent with achieving the objective of sta-
bilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
at levels that avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the global climate. By "economically rational" we
mean pursuing an approach or set of approaches that are
likely to achieve global targets at minimum cost-that is,
cost effectively. And by "politically pragmatic" we mean a
post-Kyoto regime that is likely to bring on board the
United States and engage key, rapidly-growing developing
countries in increasingly meaningful ways over time.10
Proposals attempting to meet these three criteria stretch across
a continuum of possible policy architectures starting from top-down
approaches ("centralized international agreement" with targets and
timetables), to harmonizing national policies such as carbon taxes,
to bottom-up policies that coordinate unilateral national policies."
8. Id. (enumerating weaknesses of Kyoto Protocol).
9. Id. at 1 (noting history of Harvard Project on International Climate
Agreements).
10. Id. (defining "scientifically sound," "economically rational," and "politi-
cally pragmatic").
11. See id. at 5-6 (discussing different alternative policy architectures for Post-
Kyoto period).
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The question then becomes which policy architecture (targets and
timetables, harmonized domestic policies, or coordinated and uni-
lateral national policies) best meets these three criteria, which re-
quires exploring policy alternatives within each archetype. Policies
that satisfy these three criteria will be called effective.
To answer the next level of questions, a sufficiently robust yet
tractable framework is needed to provide a context in which to as-
sess various mitigation and adaptation options. Perhaps given the
complexity of the problem, multiple frameworks should be em-
ployed in order to ferret out issues, define problem statements, and
analyze solutions. The use of an appropriate framework itself is
subject to debate. For instance, some scholars claim that the feasi-
bility constraint of International Paretianism - meaning all states
thatjoin such a treaty are equally strengthened and not made worse
off - must be part of any analytical construct instead of, for exam-
ple, a criterion or constraint related to climate justice,12 whereas
others put notions of justice front and center in any analysis.13
This paper argues that the concept of the GES is a useful
framework, albeit not necessarily the only one, to assist in working
through many of the difficult issues associated with effective mitiga-
tion policies. This framework is not a model that generates solu-
tions to the very difficult problem of formulating a successful
internationally agreeable mitigation policy. Instead, its goal is to
provide guidance and insights to facilitate arriving at feasible solu-
tions, if they exist. This paper revises and updates earlier work re-
garding the GES, as discussed by Felder, and develops the GES
framework in the context of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to
achieve an acceptable stable concentration of greenhouse gases. 14
II. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM
An early use of the term GES occurred in 1977 by Hdefele and
Sassin who traced the development of the GES over time. Their
findings emphasize the importance of "severe soft problems" such
12. Eric A. Posner & David A. Weisbach, International Paretianism: A Defense, in
HARvARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS 2012, available at http://belfercenter
.hks.harvard.edu/files/posner-weisbach-dp52.pdf (discussing International
Paretianism).
13. See EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
50 (Edward Elgar Pub. 2007) (noting role of justice in climate change analysis).
14. See Frank Felder, A Framework for Evaluation of Energy Policy Proposals, in
IEEE ENERGY 2030 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 485, 485-92 (2008) [hereinafter A
Framework for Evaluation of Energy Policy Proposals].
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as "complex management and decision-making."' 5  Others have
talked about subsystems of the GES as a system; for instance Sagar
and Holdren refer to the global energy innovation system as part of
what they refer to as the "energy sector or energy system."16 More
recently, one scholar has used the term "energy and industrial sys-
tems" and "energy-economic system" in discussing climate change
mitigation policies.17
Coincident with the needs of policymakers to reevaluate global
climate change mitigation policy, the importance of a multi-discipli-
nary approach to solving intractable social problems has long been
recognized.18 These problems consist of intertwined technological
and social complexities that cannot be adequately addressed by a
reductionist scientific approach. Analyzing these complex
problems requires a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and trans-
disciplinary effort that incorporates soft elements such as human be-
haviors and social elements, accounts for political environments
that are likely to be subject to substantial, unpredictable, and fre-
quent changes, including changes in objectives, and effectively
serves participants and stakeholders.19 A system consists of inter-
connected components and has emergent properties, properties
that are possessed by the system but not by its parts. One specific
system's approach is the CLIOS framework, which has been applied
to other complex systems, such as transportation20 and energy.21
Climate change affects the GES, and the success of climate
change policies depends on how they affect the GES. Specifically,
for mitigation polices to be effective, they must alter the physical
15. Wolf Hdfele & Wolfgang Sassin, The Global Energy System, 2 ANN. ENERGY
REv. 1, 29 (1977) (describing progression of GES).
16. See Ambuj D. Sagar & John P. Holdren, Assessing the Global Energy Innova-
tion System: Some Key Issues, 30 ENERGY POL'Y 465, 465-69 (2002).
17. See generally Adam B. Jaffe, Technology Policy and Climate Change, 3 CLIMATE
CHANGE EcoN. 1250025-1 (2012) [hereinafter Technology Policy and Climate Change]
(finding that it is important to respond to climate change in "cost-effective"
manner).
18. See Peter Checkland, Soft Systems Methodology: A Thirty Year Retrospective, 17
SYSTEMS REs. & BEHAV. Sci. S11 (2000), available at http://mail.im.tku.edu.tw/-my
day/teaching/992/SMS/S/992SMST3SPaper_20110326_softsystems.methodo
logy-retrospective checkland_2000.pdf (describing efficacy of multi-disciplinary
approach).
19. See Maurice W. Kirby, The Intellectual Journey of Russell Ackoff From OR Apos-
tle to OR Apostate, 54 J. OPERATIONAL REs. Soc'Y, 1127, 1127-40 (2003) (discussing
Ackoff's rejection of mathematical systems of operational systems for wider social
and political approaches).
20. See JOSEPH M. SUSSMAN, PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS (Springer 2005).
21. See A Framework for Evaluation of Energy Policy Proposals, supra note 14, at
485-92.
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world in ways that would not have occurred without the policies.
Policies that could have such an impact on the physical world in-
clude a carbon-free technological mandate for new energy sources,
a change in the economic system, for example by implementing a
carbon tax, or the creation of a new political institution, such as an
international treaty. Thus, the GES framework, if it is to be useful,
must encompass the multiple levels of technology, economics, and
politics. Of course, mitigation proposals are made and, if imple-
mented, operate within a particular context. The GES contains sev-
eral important structural features discussed below that mitigation
proposals should address if they are to be successful. The following
discussion of particular elements of the GES is not exclusive and is
not meant to suggest that each item is of equal importance for
every type of context and mitigation proposal. Nonetheless, it at-
tempts to capture the GES's essential CLIOS features in the context
of climate change.
A. The Global Energy System is Extremely Large in Scale
Energy projects are large-scale in cost, physical size, lifetimes,
and impacts. According to the World Energy Outlook, "Large-scale
investment in energy-supply infrastructure is required to replace ex-
isting supply capacity and expand to meet growing energy needs.
In the New Policies Scenario, cumulative investment of $37 trillion
is needed in the world's energy supply system over 2012-2035,
equivalent to 1.5% of global GDP on average during that period."22
Regarding the electric power sector,
A total of 5 890 GW (gigawatts) of capacity additions -
more than the total installed capacity of the whole world
in 2011 - is required over the Outlook period. One-third of
this is to replace retiring plants; the rest is to meet growing
electricity demand. Renewables represent half the capac-
ity additions, at 3 000 GW over the period 2012-35, fol-
lowed by [natural] gas at 1 400 GW. The total power
sector requires investment over 2012-35 of $16.9 trillion,
almost half the total energy supply infrastructure invest-
ment in this period. Two-fifths of this investment is for
electricity networks, while the rest is for generation capac-
ity. Of the investment in generation capacity, more than
22. World Energy Outlook 2012 Factsheet, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining invest-
ment necessary to meet energy \ demand from 2012-2035).
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60% is for renewables - principally wind (22%), hydro
(16%), and solar PV (13%).23
The GES spans the earth and crosses multiple national and
sub-national political boundaries. Oil, natural gas, coal, and ura-
nium are shipped across the globe, and electricity is transmitted
hundreds to approximately a thousand miles across multiple states
and countries. Energy investments are long-lived assets, spanning
decades, if not longer. For example, in the case of a U.S. nuclear
waste disposal site for commercially spent fuel, the site must pre-
vent the release of radionuclides to the accessible environment for
at least one thousand years.24 U.S. nuclear power plants are initially
licensed for forty years, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) may extend their licenses for an additional twenty
years. Research is underway to enable nuclear power plants to last
eighty years. Other types of power plants, refineries, pipelines, and
production facilities have similar operating lives, although they can
be expanded, upgraded, and revised over the course of their multi-
ple decades of life. On the consumption side, buildings last on the
order of a century. The shortest duration products are probably
automobiles and consumer appliances, such as refrigerators, stoves,
hot water heaters, air conditioners, and similar consumer products,
which last five to fifteen years.
The GES has large-scale impacts. The obvious, but not the
only example, is climate change. Changes in the price of oil rever-
berate almost instantly throughout the global economy and this
may soon be the case with natural gas, as LNG transportation in-
creases the transition of natural gas from a continental to a global
market. Similarly, atmospheric emissions, including greenhouse
gases, affect the globe and multi-national regions. Even within a
country, the impacts of air pollution can be devastating. For exam-
ple, recent air pollution levels in Beijing, China were literally off the
charts.2 5
The large-scale nature of the GES has immediate implications
for mitigation policies. These policies must span the globe, cover
all the uses of energy, including transportation, electricity, and
heating, and be able to fund the tremendous amount of investment
23. Id. at 3 (outlining statistics about electric power sector).
24. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92059, CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
(2002), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/waste/waste-2.cfm (discuss-
ing problems of nuclear energy's waste).
25. Blackest Day, ECONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.economist
.com/blogs/analects/2013/01/beijings-air-pollution (noting issues Beijing, China
faces due to air pollution).
2014] 95
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needed to replace and expand the existing GES. Mitigation poli-
cies that are designed to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations
must reduce greenhouse gas emissions to levels that are currently
being removed by nature and humans. This requires a drastic re-
duction in greenhouse gas emissions, perhaps more than sixty per-
cent.2 6 Further, if this stabilization is to limit global average
temperature increases, it must be done in a relatively short period
of time, perhaps several decades or less. Since fossil fuels are the
dominant energy source for all major uses of energy, achieving rela-
tively near-term stabilization in effect requires a complete overhaul
of the existing and proposed GES. For example, in the United
States, the transportation sector is almost entirely oil based, the
electric power sector is about seventy percent coal and natural gas,
and the heating sector is almost one hundred percent oil and natu-
ral gas.2 7
Moreover, although most greenhouse gases are emitted as a
result of energy production and consumption, either the non-en-
ergy sources of greenhouse gases also must be substantially re-
duced, or energy-related greenhouse gases must be reduced further
to compensate for the corresponding lack of reduction in non-en-
ergy greenhouse gases. Adding to this difficult task is the problem
that there is no single scalable carbon-free technology that can be
deployed to achieve relatively near-term and perhaps even long-
term stabilization goals.28
B. Jurisdictional and Boundary Issues
Due to the large-scale nature of the GES, it crosses many juris-
dictional boundaries. There are approximately 190 countries, all
affected to various degrees, by international oil markets, global cli-
mate change, natural gas transportation, electric power systems,
and other subsystems and components of the GES. In the case of
the United States, with its federal system, there are local (including
villages, towns, and counties), state, and national governments with
different roles and responsibilities with respect to energy planning
26. Technology Policy and Climate Change, supra note 17, at 1250025-3 (noting
greenhouse gas levels should be lowered in order to stabilize climate); H. Damon
Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions, 35 GEO-
PHYSICAL REs. LETTERs L04705 (2008) (outlining effects of different levels of car-
bon dioxide emissions in same 500 year period).
27. Total Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/
(last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (analyzing major sources of energy in U.S.).
28. See generally Technology Policy and Climate Change, supra note 17 (noting
need for technology that provides climate stabilization in near-future).
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and policies. Because the costs and benefits of specific energy in-
vestments and operations are not uniform, different jurisdictions
have different views. For example, the state of Maine may oppose
building a transmission line from Maine to Boston, Massachusetts
because it would raise electricity prices in Maine and negatively af-
fect land usage and value, whereas those in Boston may support the
line for its reliability and economic benefits.
These jurisdictional disputes are not limited only to current
governments. The GES spans long swaths of time as well as geogra-
phy. One can think of a future government as another "jurisdic-
tion" that may have a different view of what today's government
decides. In addition, within a given jurisdiction and government,
there may be disputes between agencies or branches of the
government.
The inter-jurisdictional nature of mitigation policy inevitably
slows down changes to the GES as multiple jurisdictions must try to
resolve their differences. Attempts at meaningful international cli-
mate policy demonstrate this point. In some cases, there is an over-
arching governmental entity, for example the U.S. federal
government, which can, under certain circumstances, step in and
resolve jurisdictional disputes. Staying with the U.S. example, the
siting of natural gas pipelines is basically a federally-driven process
with state and local input that proceeds in an orderly manner. This
is in sharp contrast to siting transmission lines, which is dictated by
localities and states. Although U.S. federal authority has increased
in this area recently, it remains to be seen if it can resolve these
seemingly intractable inter-state siting issues. In issues that cross
national jurisdictional boundaries, there is no higher authority that
can resolve them unless the nations themselves agree to such a
structure. Forming such a structure and having it operate is in itself
time-consuming, as the experience since the signing of the Kyoto
Treaty has shown.
C. The Global Energy System is Complex and Uncertain
The GES has manifold complexity. Borrowing from the
CLIOS literature,29 the GES is structurally complex because it con-
tains a large number of interconnected parts: it exhibits behavioral
29. See generally JOSEPH M. SussmAN, THE "CLIOS PRocEss": A USER'S GUIDE
(2007), available at http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/engineering-systems-division/esd-
04j-frameworks-and-models-in-engineering-systems-engineering-system-design-
spring-2007/readings/clios-process.pdf [hereinafter CLIOS PROCESS] (discussing
complexity of GES).
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complexity because predictions of system behavior and outputs are
hard, it contains nested complexity between the physical and tech-
nical components and the economic and political institutions that
interact and govern parts of the GES, and it also has evaluative com-
plexity because the users of the GES are multiple stakeholders that
evaluate system performance in very different and even opposing
ways.
Take one important subsystem of the GES: the electric power
sector. Connected to this subsystem are additional subsystems of
varying degrees of complexity, such as nuclear generation units,
transmission lines, and distribution subsystems. One indication of
the sector's complexity is illustrated by the blackout that occurred
in the Eastern Interconnection on August 14, 2003, that affected
Ontario, Canada, and parts of the United States, despite the enor-
mous effort made to operate the grid reliably.30 Another example
is the series of nuclear reactor accidents that occurred in
Fukushima, Japan starting on March 11, 2011.
Complexity and uncertainty are related: complexity causes un-
certainty, but is also caused by uncertainty. Some of these uncer-
tainties are epistemic (i.e., the uncertainty itself is uncertain), not
just aleatory (i.e., the uncertainty is well defined, such as the
probabilities associated with rolling a die). Uncertainty exists re-
garding the current GES and increases dramatically when trying to
predict what would happen under various mitigation proposals over
long periods of time. Global climate change illustrates numerous
uncertainties, their ranges, and implications. 3' The uncertainties
include the magnitude, impacts, costs, and ability of different poli-
cies to address global climate change. In some cases, the ranges of
uncertainties are quantified, such as the likely range of temperature
changes under different scenarios; in other cases, uncertainties are
identified but not quantified, such as the effects of ocean acidifica-
tion. Appropriate treatment of uncertainty without overwhelming
the analysis is a difficult and open question.
The world's climate and the GES contain many positive feed-
backs, which can be undesirable because they can lead to runaway
systems behavior, and negative feedbacks, which can be desirable
30. Paul Hines, Jay Apt, & Sarosh Talukdar, Large Blackouts in North America:
Historical Trends and Policy Implications, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 5249, 5249-59 (2009) (dis-
cussing electric power sector's complexity).
31. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIs REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERs (2007), available at http://
wvw.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr-spm.pdf (highlighting un-
certainties regarding climate change).
10
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because they stabilize system behavior, that further complicate pre-
dicting system behavior. Within the climate system, some impor-
tant examples of feedback are clouds, the ice albedo, hydrological
cycle, and water vapor.32 In the GES, energy prices are a major
source of negative feedback; as prices increase, new production ar-
eas and technologies are pursued and demand decreases, driving
the GES into equilibrium. This can lead to unanticipated conse-
quences in the context of mitigation. Low U.S. natural gas prices
have reduced the use of coal to produce electricity, reducing the
price of coal, which has led to exporting coal to Europe. The net
impact on global greenhouse gas emissions is not clear, in part, be-
cause European Union's greenhouse gas cap-and-trade policies
would have to be considered.
The importance of energy prices, both in anticipating future
energy production and consumption and as a mechanism to imple-
ment mitigation policies, cannot be overstated. Energy prices per-
vade the GES and inform the decisions of the world's population
and the millions of businesses and organizations that use and pro-
duce energy. The pricing mechanisms that policymakers use to im-
plement and fund mitigation policies also affect their success.ss For
instance, if the cost of solar power becomes slightly less than the
cost of natural gas-fired generation, the price of natural gas will de-
crease because less of it will be used to produce electricity, all else
being equal. With the lower cost of natural gas, other uses of natu-
ral gas will increase, including some rebound in electricity
consumption.
The complexity of the GES is exacerbated by the interplay be-
tween uncertainty and sunk costs. Much, if not all, of the initial
investment in energy assets are sunk, that is, irreversible. Once a
hydroelectric, nuclear, coal, or natural gas fired unit is built, it can-
not be converted into another type of asset or moved. (A gas tur-
bine can be converted to a combine cycle unit, however.) This is in
sharp contrast to other investments, such as an airplane, which can
obviously be moved or converted from a passenger to a cargo plane,
or to a computer that can be used commercially for a business such
as a flower shop, or individually, such as by a student.
32. See generally DAVID ARCHER, GLOBAL WARMING: UNDERSTANDING THE FORE-
CAST (John Wiley & Sons, ltd., 2nd ed. 2012) (examining climate system feedback
examples).
33. Frank Felder, Examining Electricity Price Suppression Due to Renewable Re-
sources and Other Grid Investments, 24 ELECTR. J. 34, 34-46 (May 2011) (analyzing
interconnectivity of energy prices and policymakers' pricing mechanisms).
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Making a new investment when the future is uncertain is risky
and therefore costly. Prior to making a sunk investment under un-
certainty, it may be more economic to delay the investment beyond
the start date that a standard net present value (NPV) analysis
would conclude because NPV analysis does not account for the cost
of the option to delay.34 Correspondingly, investments that are
flexible and can respond to changes in future conditions have an
additional value that standard NPV analysis does not capture. Once
the investment has been made, however, the asset is economic to
operate so long as it recovers its going-forward costs, which can be
small. So even if a new technology has a lower total cost than an
existing technology's total cost, the new technology will not replace
(without governmental intervention) existing assets unless its total
costs are less than the existing technology's going-forward costs.
These going-forward costs will typically arise in the future, perhaps
slowly, as the asset depreciates and requires more ongoing costs to
maintain its operations.
The combination of sunk investments, uncertainty, and some
project flexibility gives rise to identifying, quantifying, and execut-
ing real options. Energy projects (and therefore mitigation poli-
cies) display several sources of flexibility, including project
development activities, modularity, flexible designs, and operations,
and involve both compound and parallel options.35 Determining
the amount of flexibility that is optimal in individual energy
projects is a challenging issue, but provides an opportunity to ad-
dress uncertainty and improve energy investment and operational
decisions.3 6
34. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY (Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (discussing benefits of delaying uncertain
investments).
35. See generally Luis M. Abadie & Jos6 M. Chamorro, Valuation ofEnergy Invest-
ments as Real Options: The Case of an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle Power Plant
(2005), available at http://www.realoptions.org/papers2005/Abadie_IGCC3101
.pdf (discussing valuation of options stemming from flexibility in Integrated Gasifi-
cation Combined Cycle Power Plant); Richard de Neufville, Real Options: Dealing
with Uncertainty in Systems Planning and Design, 4 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 26 (2003),
available at http://ardent.mit.edu/real_options/Real-opts-papers/delftpaperpub
lication.pdf (analyzing wide range of applications of analysis of real options, using
documented cases in many fields of engineering); Tao Wang & Richard de Neuf-
ville, Identification of Real Options "in" Projects (2006), available at http://ardent.mit
.edu/realoptions/Real_0ptspapers/Identification%20of%20Real%200ption%
20in%20Projects%20INCOSE.pdf (reviewing sources of flexibility in energy
projects).
36. Frank Felder, Integrating Financial Theory and Methods in Electricity Resource
Planning, 24 ENERGY POL'Y 149, 149-54 (1996) (identifying benefits of determining
optimal flexibility for individual energy projects).
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D. The Global Energy System is Interconnected
The GES is interconnected to other CLIOS systems such as
transportation, the global climate system, communications, bank-
ing and finance, health services, and water and security. The im-
portance of some of these interconnections are illustrated during
electricity blackouts that shutdown transportation, water, and finan-
cial systems. IEA, among others, emphasizes the large and increas-
ing amounts of water that is required for energy production, such
as for shale natural gas.3 7
Understanding the costs and benefits of energy projects and
who bears those costs and who benefits from them is critical in de-
signing and implementing effective mitigation proposals. Energy
projects result in both benefits and costs that accrue and are borne
by society, but in many cases, not by the investors and direct users.
Negative externalities such as environmental emissions are an ex-
ample, and include sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, carbon
dioxide, thermal discharges, and solid waste products, among
others.38 The electric power system is a network with AC power
flows on one part of the grid impacting flows on other parts. Gen-
eration capacity is a positive externality as more capacity reduces
the loss of load probability for the system, which benefits all users of
the grid, notjust the generation owner and its buyer.39 The cost of
interruption of electric service in the United States is estimated on
the order of twenty-five billion to one hundred billion dollars a year
and is an example in which the electricity sector bears the costs of
reliability but society in general bears the costs of unreliability.40
E. The Global Energy System is a Sociotechnical System
The term "sociotechnical" emphasizes that a CLIOS system is
not just a technical system, such as a complex computer system, or
solely a social system, in which technology is not a critical considera-
37. See World Energy Outlook 2012 Factsheet, supra note 3, at 1, 6.
38. Anthony D. Owen, Renewable Energy: Externality Costs as Market Barriers, 34
ENERGY POL'Y 632, 635-38 (2006), available at http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au/sites/
default/files/uploads/publications/MarketBarriers.pdf (assessing externalities of
power generation).
39. See Adam B. Jaffe & Frank Felder, Should Electricity Markets Have a Capacity
Requirement: If So, How Should it be Priced?, 9 ELECTR. J. 52 (Dec. 1996) (discussing
positive externalities associated with electricity market capacities).
40. JOSEPH ETO ET AL., SCOPING STUDY ON TRENDS IN THE EcoNoMic VALUE OF
ELECTRICITY RELIABILITY TO THE U.S. EcoNoMY 15-16 (Lawrence Berkley National
Laboratory 2001), available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/787133-
3Nphiw/nativ e/787133.pdf (discussing cost of interruption of electrical service).
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tion. 4 1 Energy policies and plans produce merit goods, goods that
are of vital importance to human wellbeing and therefore are of
critical political and social importance. As a result, mitigation poli-
cies have an immense political dimension requiring that the politi-
cal and policymaking process must be considered in addition to the
critically important technical and economic issues. This applies
even in the case of wholesale electricity markets causing challenges
in aligning these markets with broader public policies such as cli-
mate mitigation. 42
The term "open" means that the GES explicitly includes social,
political, and economic aspects and not just technical or engineer-
ing characteristics. In the 2008 paper A Framework for Evaluation of
Energy Policy Proposals, Felder presents a high-level depiction of the
GES. 4 3 The physical system is enclosed within the institutional
sphere that organizes, regulates, invests in, operates, establishes
markets, and otherwise directly influences components of the
world's physical energy system. Two-way arrows between the physi-
cal system and the institutional sphere indicate that there are both
positive and negative feedbacks between these two elements. En-
compassing the institutional sphere is the social and political con-
text. Positive and negative feedbacks exist between both the social
and political context and the institutional sphere. The feedbacks
include communication and control signals among these three
levels.
Climate change mitigation is an important, perhaps even the
most important, energy policy and planning goal, but it is certainly
not the only one. Many of the definitions of sustainability encom-
pass economic, environmental, and social goals, and even all of
human values. Energy proposals and plans attempt to advance
many different objectives,4 4 although some advocate using sus-
tainability as an organizing principle for CLIOS systems.4 5 Three
41. CLIOS PROCESS, supra note 29, at 7 (defining primary characteristics of
CLIOS Systems).
42. See Frank A. Felder, Watching the ISO Watchman, 25 ELECTR. J. 24 (Dec.
2012) (discussing energy policy considerations).
43. See A Framework for Evaluation ofEnergy Policy Proposals, supra note 14, at 488
(depicting World Energy System and how feedback flows between spheres).
44. See Felder, Andrews, & Hulkower, supra note 2, at 31-62; see also Hatice
Tekiner, David W. Coit & Frank Felder, Multi-Period Multi-Objective Electricity Genera-
tion Expansion Planning Problem with Monte-Carlo Simulation, 80 ELEC. POWER Sys.
RES. 1394, 1394-1405 (2010) (detailing new approach to electricity generation ex-
pansion problem).
45. SeeJOEL CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD ET AL., SUSTAINABILITY AS AN ORGANIZING
DESIGN PRINCIPLE FOR LARGE-SCALE ENGINEERING SYSTEMS 1-46 (Engineering Sys-
tems Monograph 2004), available at http://esd.mit.edu/symposium/pdfs/mono
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broad energy planning and policy substantive objectives that are
commonly articulated are economic, environmental, and security,
and each of these broad objectives contains numerous subordinate
objectives. In addition, there are process objectives such as public
input and acceptability that are also important.4 6
Within these three goals are many subservient goals, and not
surprisingly different stakeholders place different levels of impor-
tance on these three major goals and the subservient goals. Fur-
thermore, stakeholders may not even agree on a listing of
subservient goals even if they were to agree upon the three major
goals. Stakeholders may also behave strategically by not being com-
pletely forthright about their values and objectives. For example, a
group of stakeholders may overemphasize the value it places on a
particular objective in order to try to achieve a compromise closer
to its desired position.
Due to the sociotechnical nature of the GES and its provision
of merit goods, political institutions and processes are part of the
GES institutional sphere. Political time horizons tend to be ex-
tremely short-term compared to the lifetimes of components of the
GES. The large inertia in the GES makes it difficult for politicians
to achieve meaningful improvements within their time horizon. In
addition, regulatory and policy processes have their own inertia.47
Once a particular policy or plan has been adopted, path depen-
dency, incrementalism, and inertia become issues. Resource con-
straints restrict the availability and processing of information by
particular decision makers in the regulatory process, and this leads
to issues such as path dependency, switching costs, and incre-
mentalism.48 The effect is that even though the new path would
deliver better results, an existing regulatory path is more likely to be
graph/sustainability.pdf (making normative argument that sustainability should be
core, overarching principle in design of complex engineering systems).
46. See generally Felder, Andrews, & Hulkower, supra note 2, at 31-62 (analyz-
ing public input and acceptability).
47. Elizabeth Kirk, Alison Reeves, & Kirsty L. Blackstock, Path Dependency and
the Implementation of Environmental Regulation, 25 ENv'T & PLANNING C: Gov'T &
POL'Y 250, 250-68 (2007) [hereinafter Path Dependency] (describing implementa-
tion of regulations); Mort Webster, Incorporating Path Dependency into Decision-Ana-
lytic Methods: An Application to Global Climate-Change Policy, 5 DECISION ANALYSIs 60,
60-75 (2008), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSP
GCReprint08-23.pdf.
48. Path Dependency, supra note 47, at 250-68 (analyzing effects of resource
constraints on decision-making).
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followed than the new path.49 Thus, institutional change needs to
occur as part of policy change.50
These policy and planning processes are intricate, intertwined,
and extensive. In the case of NewJersey's energy master plan, there
were on the order of five hundred stakeholders involved in its for-
mulation.5' Also consider the U.S. electric power sector. Local,
state, regional, and federal agencies have various types of authority
over the industry from siting of facilities, wholesale market design,
and transmission and retail rate determinations. In addition, nu-
merous stakeholders have important interests as evidenced by the
numerous customers of Independent System Operators (ISOs), en-
tities that operate parts of the grid and administer wholesale elec-
tricity markets in much of the United States. The ISO governance
process involves hundreds of actors, a hierarchy of committees, and
multiple steps even before consideration by its regulator, the U.S.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. At the global level, the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro from June 3-14, 1992, had 172
governments attending along with approximately 2,400 representa-
tives of non-government organizations (NGOs) and seventeen
thousand people participating in the parallel NGO forum.52
Given the range and likely substantial value of mitigation op-
tions, it is unclear whether in practice planning processes involving
stakeholders improve or reduce the ability to exercise options or if,
and how, they could be designed to enhance the ability to create
and exercise these options. For example, typically these processes
require transparent decision-making and involvement of stakehold-
ers. It is not known what conditions and types of public policy
processes would result in appropriately implementing real options.
For strategic negotiation reasons, some stakeholders may intention-
ally discount the value of flexibility in order to foreclose the consid-
eration of options that they find undesirable. On the other hand,
having large numbers and diverse stakeholders involved in a pro-
cess may improve the identification of options than would occur
otherwise, as discussed by de Neufville, who argues, in the context
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Frank Felder, Nancy Mantell, Nora Lovrien Buehler, & Andrew Cottrell,
Energy Master Planning: The Case of New Jersey, ENVIRONMENTALISM: ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, 41, 41-72 (Elias Kahraman & Ah-
med Baig eds., Nova Publishers 2009) (presenting NewJersey's energy master plan
case to show intricacies of policy and planning processes).
52. See Earth Summit, UNITED NATIONS (last visited Nov. 10, 2013), http://www
.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html.
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of projects internal to company, for the need to assemble represent-
atives of various groups to implement real options.53
Some regulatory policies discourage options with "used and
useful" tests. In regulated portions of the energy industry (e.g.,
transmission and distribution of electricity and natural gas transpor-
tation), regulatory policies may not allow or limit the recovery of
investments that promote flexibility if those investments are never
used, for example those associated with unexercised options.5 4 Fur-
thermore, many changes in energy policy require legislative action
or regulatory proceedings, which involve stakeholder and public in-
put. In some cases, it may be difficult to execute an option, for
example, the option to terminate the development of a project, be-
cause the project creates constituencies that benefit from the pro-
ject's continued development and thereby oppose its termination.
III. CONCLUSION
Effective climate change mitigation will require the stabiliza-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions, and if this can occur with a mini-
mal increase in global average temperature, such stabilization
needs to occur soon. Stabilization, whether sooner or later, re-
quires that sources and sinks of greenhouse gases be in equilib-
rium, which roughly corresponds to at least a sixty percent
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions at today's levels. The GES is
a useful, but not necessarily the only, framework to understand cli-
mate change mitigation policies and proposals. The GES is a large-
scale system in which no single, carbon-free, or scalable technology
exists that would stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in the relatively
near future. It is an interconnected and open system, providing
vital services in and of itself, but also to other complex systems such
as transportation, communication, water, and security. The GES
also reflects our fundamental human values and thus is a point of
negotiation and contention among numerous stakeholders across
multiple jurisdictional boundaries. Although specific policy impli-
cations of the GES in the context of climate mitigation are alluded
to, but not discussed in this paper, mitigation policies need to be
scalable, overcome the inertia of the GES, be able to anticipate and
respond to unforeseen outcomes, and integrate technical, eco-
53. de Neufville, Real Options: Dealing with Uncertainty in Systems Planning and
Design, supra note 35, at 26 (suggesting possible advantages of involving more
stakeholders).
54. WilliamJ. Baumol & Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity
Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383, 383-99 (2002) (noting show some
regulatory policies discourage "used and useful" test).
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nomic, and political factors across multiple jurisdictional bounda-
ries that not only address mitigation, but other important
substantive and process objectives.
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